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POLITICS OF WHISKY
which might have tumultuous repercussions in a particular industry, in the marketplace, and in citizens' lives.
For much of the eighteenth century, economic legislation was more the result of special interest lobbying than government policy. As a recent study of parliamentary legislation affecting the cotton trade laments, early eighteenth-century ministers of the crown "never pretended to formulate anything recognizable as an industrial policy." Their private papers have been combed and reveal "no interest in economic policy even among ministers charged with dealing with trade and business." To the contrary, when they did dabble in industrial affairs, these ministers appear to have had immediate political goals at heart.'? Things began to change by the end of the century, and much has been made of the influence of free trade ideas on Shelburne and Pitt, and in particular Pitt's explicit homage to Adam Smith in his famous budget speech of 1792.11 Still, Boyd Hilton maintains, "British governments in the late eighteenth century made no attempts to control the spontaneous and uncoordinated processes known as the 'first Industrial Revolution.' Helpless in the teeth of gale-force growth, they did not know whether they should be putting the vessel back to port or letting her loose on an ocean of change, and rather than navigate the economy they eagerly endorsed the new ideas of laissez-faire and a minimum state."12 Yet letting go of the tiller and refusing to navigate in the midst of the storm was dangerous business, especially where the security of tax receipts were concerned. Pitt and his associates recognized this. When they ultimately embraced a program of free trade with respect to the Scottish distilleries, they acted not out of desperation but out of a commitment to elevating state policy above the fray of special-interest lobbying. The problem was that at the very moment that the politicians and bureaucrats, aware of the state's changing character and responsibilities, desired to free it from external pressures, industrialists, proud of their increasing economic importance, sought a hand in influencing its affairs. In the case of the Scottish distill-eries, we can trace how those administrators, initially overwhelmed by the manufacturers, ultimately reclaimed the initiative in economic policy formulation.
The years that followed Pitt's taking office were marked by great experimentation and change. Pitt attacked the problem of state finances on two fronts. On the one hand, he committed himself to debt redemption and the creation of a new Sinking Fund. On the other, he set about reorganizing the tax structure with an eye to increased efficiency and higher yields from existing taxes. As early as September of 1785, an ebullient Pitt could boast that "the produce of our revenues is glorious, and I am half mad with a project which will give our supplies the effect almost of magic in the reduction of the debt." The fund he envisioned, Pitt promised his reform-minded friend, William Wilberforce, "will be at least new and eccentric enough to satisfy your constant call for something out of the common way." 13 In fact, however, Pitt's reputation as a fiscal reformer lay less in the original inspiration behind his programs, most of which dated to earlier ministries and investigatory commissions, than in his ability to orchestrate their long-awaited and simultaneous administration.
Sir Robert Walpole's Sinking Fund, established in 1716, was of course still in effect, but for most of the century it had been plundered by ministers, including Walpole himself, in times of need.'4 Lord North had succeeded in applying some surplus revenue to debt redemption, but his efforts were relatively piecemeal and naturally interrupted by the outbreak of the American War, while Shelburne's reform ideas never had time to come to fruition. It remained therefore for Pitt to embrace the challenge of resurrecting and institutionalizing the original purpose of the fund.15 "The wished for day" arrived on March 29, 1786, when Pitt finally moved in the Commons for the introduction of a plan to appropriate ?1 million in surplus revenue annually for the exclusive purpose of purchasing shares of government stocks. "All despondency and gloomy fear," he proudly proclaimed, "may be laid aside, and our pros-POLITICS OF WHISKY pects brightened with joy and hope."16 Indeed, unlike Walpole's fund, Pitt's was meant to be inviolable: the only way to interrupt the proper flow of funds was by parliamentary statute, but this, Pitt believed, no politician would dare to do. 17 Meanwhile, on the tax front, the Commutation Act was followed by a host of revenue reforms designed to improve the procedures for detecting and punishing tax frauds. In 1786, the government delegated the management of problematic customs duties, most notably those on wine and tobacco, to the more efficient Excise Office, while the next year it put another old reform idea into practice with the consolidation of duties. Over the course of the century, as new taxes had been levied to back new loans, a single imported good might come to have been subjected to as many as fourteen separate customs duties, all payable into different accounts. Although it was technically the merchant's responsibility to make the necessary computations, the task grew so complicated that most opted to hire customs officers to do the job for them. Merchants thus became the officers' personal "clients," paying (or bribing) them generously and thus undermining the officers' loyalty to their primary employer-the state.18 The antidote to this fraud-infested system, the consolidation of all customs duties, was, as Pitt confessed on introducing his bill, so obvious that "it was more difficult to account for its having been delayed so long, than to prove the propriety of now adopting it." Even the Opposition agreed,19 and once in operation the Consolidation Act transformed the Customs, according to its historian, into a "modern" government service.20 Other departments followed suit, for while abuses might have been most pronounced in the Customs, they were by no means unique to that office. Pitt's appeal rested, however, on more than his "generosity," "integrity," and the self-sacrifice from which, according to Lord Effingham, they derived. He also acquired a reputation as a workaholic, a statesman for whom the bureaucratic work of government was all-consuming. Legend has it that Pitt died at age forty-seven, the victim of his own industriousness. Some would add to the cause of death the "compensatory drinking" which accompanied all that work, but this perhaps enhanced the image. Moreover, whether true or apocryphal, Pitt's lauded combination of administrative devotion and personal disinterestedness, and his ability to rise above the normal fray of political life, had a very real consequence. For it enabled the traditional, patrician system of government to survive in the closing decades of the eighteenth century by associating itself with a new professionalism and moral probity.31 In part due to his patriotic ancestry (he was, after all, the beneficiary of "the name and recollections which attached to the great Earl of Chatham's son"),32 in part due to his youth and the aura of innocence which he brought to office, in part due to his remarkable fiscal and political skills, in part due to his willingness to open government service to some new "men of talent," and in part due to his desire to keep insiders and favor seekers at bay as he began breaking down some of the old alliances between vested interests and the state33-for all these reasons, Pitt's early ministry projected the image of one dedicated to increasing the efficiency of government, a welcome message in the wake of the humiliating and expensive loss of the American colonies.
Yet in instituting some of its reform policies, the Pitt government ran head-on into knots of special interest groups. At the very moment that it sought to make the state more autonomous and responsible, to free it from interest politics, sectional groups demanded its ear. Clearly, the East India Company benefitted from the Commutation Act's attack on the trade in smuggled tea; that its merchants and accountants assisted the ministry in designing the new law came as no surprise. In other cases, however, the government's very reform proposals actually encouraged the creation of new lobbies and interests. Nowhere was this more pronounced than in industry, and in the new, capital-intensive industries in particular. So vociferous and ultimately disruptive did their lobbying efforts prove that Pitt and his associates came to recognize that a new system for the formulation of economic policy was also in order, one 31 These were the professionals to whom fell the responsibility for implementing successive pieces of legislation introduced by the Pitt government for the better regulation of the Scottish distilleries (see table 1 ). In the face of such tinkering, the excisemen could not help but conclude, as one commissioner complained in 1796, that these legislative "experiments" were proceeding too slowly and meeting with too little success.44 They had long been of this opinion; for while they shared the government's commitment to rationalizing the Excise, to bringing to it greater order and efficiency, these experts in the field believed that the politicians were going about it the wrong way. Indeed, the villains of Burns's poem were to prove themselves rather accomplished political economists by the time the experiments were completed, some of them grasping the essence of laissez-faire long before the politicians whose laws they implemented.
On some levels, the Pitt administration's interest in the distilleries was unremarkable if not predictable. Excise duties "will lie most justly upon wines, tobacco and strong waters" declared Sir Christopher Pack already in 1657.45 In the late eighteenth century, alcohol, like tobacco, numbered among the few "eligible and widely approved objects of taxation," possessing the dual advantages of extensive consumer markets and status as a luxury rather than a necessity.46 Even whisky, although viewed by many to be "an article of almost necessary consumption in Scotland," was deemed a legitimate object of taxation "for the sake of health, morals, and the industry of the people, as well as for the benefit 43 fTo inhibit tax evasion by rapid distillation, a duty of 2s. 6d. was charged on each gallon of "surplus spirits" (i.e., those produced beyond a given still's legitimate yield) and 2s. per gallon deficiency.
DIETZ
gSurplus and deficient spirit duties were imposed, as in the Lowlands. hThe surplus duty was raised to 3s. per gallon; the deficient spirit duty lowered to 6d. per gallon. Meanwhile, a new duty of 6d. was imposed on every gallon of spirits produced, and the Lowland wash duty was reintroduced at a rate of 2.5d.
iThe intermediate zone was abolished. Like the Lowlands, the Highlands were now subject to a spirit duty and new rates for a given still's surplus or shortfall. As in 1784, however, the Highlands were spared the new wash duty. of the Revenue."47 Governments in search of additional revenue consequently turned almost by reflex to spirits. Yet high duties invited fraud, and "so excessive was the taxation to which spirits were subjected" The Lowland distillers were far from pleased, however, with the means by which this equality was achieved, the Wash Act extending to their factories the assessment procedures used in England and authorizing excisemen to enter distilleries at any time of day or night to check production levels. This inconvenience they considered particularly oppressive in light of their Highland neighbors' exemption from it, for wholly different provisions were made under the act for taxing distillation in the Highlands. Due to the impracticality of monitoring the thousands of small stills scattered throughout the far north, distillers there paid an annual license fee-a tax on the possession of the still-in lieu of duties on their wash. The Commissioners of Excise had toyed with the idea of prohibiting altogether the use of small Highland stills on the grounds that they were the source of most illicit production, but so central was whisky to the local economy and way of life-the commissioners deeming it "an Article which [the Highlanders] cannot want, and must have in one Way or another"'54-that a plan was devised instead to encourage legal production on a limited scale.55
The Highland-Lowland divide thus became a statutory reality with the passage of the Wash Act, with distilling in Scotland, long recognized as two distinct processes, now officially treated as such. The Highlands' unique circumstances, both agricultural and cultural, were taken into account, while the large-scale, industrial producers in the south were subjected to more vigilant assessment practices. In fact, however, the situa- In just two years, three separate assessment systems were thus established, with unique collection procedures and duty rates operating in each. Scotland's highest-ranking excise officials claimed to have "had no opportunity of being officially acquainted" with the "principles and calculations" on which the latest legislation was devised. To the contrary, the working details of the Lowland Licensing Act were "settled by the Capital Distillers in England and in Scotland,"63 while the government, acting as a special interest broker, dismantled some of its recent, impressive standardizing reforms, reforms which, in terms of revenue returns, appeared to have been working.64
This curious scenario raises a number of questions. Why, for example, did the politicians ignore the opinion of the Commissioners of Excise and embrace a system more idiosyncratic than the one with which they had started? Why did they listen to manufacturers who, in the words of one excise report, "finding themselves cramped in carrying on their illegal trade, began, by publications, meetings, memorials, and otherwise, to raise a loud, and general cry of hardship and oppression thro' the Country, complaining that they could not carry on their business with advantage if they were so strictly looked after, and obliged to pay the full legal Duties?"65 After all, as an observer scathingly remarked, "the House I believe has at present under Consideration a law for regulating the Police of London and Westminster, but I very much doubt if it would be wise in them to frame the law agreeable to the advices of the footpads and Pickpockets."66 It was an apt analogy: James Stein twice attempted to pass money to the unappreciative Solicitor of Excise, John Bonar, the second time slipping a parcel containing ?500 in bank notes (which the distiller subsequently identified as "a pair of gloves") into Bonar's pocket at the end of a breakfast meeting; insisting it was gift and not a bribe, Stein was acquitted of charges of attempting "to corrupt, and seduce" Bonar by a jury which chose to ignore the judge's instructions.67 Moreover, Stein was not unique. The Scottish Commissioners of Excise reported that "many, if not most of these Traders" (i.e., the great Lowland distillers) had engaged in "improper Conduct, and corrupt practices."68 How, therefore, did such men, with such motives, come to play 
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so prominent a role in policy formulation in a political administration so ostentatiously committed to public and private virtue? The answers to these questions lie beyond the particular incidents and must be seen as part of several broader, political patterns. For when it came to excise taxes on industrial products, Pitt had cause to be wary of the organized resistance of industrial producers. Perhaps manufacturers' greatest complaint in the early 1780s was about the existing system of taxation which, in their opinion, was burdening (or, as they might say, oppressing) manufacturing. This was a concern cutting across otherwise seemingly insuperable regional and industrial divisions. Indeed, the desire to find "proper" modes of taxation-they favored direct taxes on land or wealth-proved the one rallying cry which could unite manufacturers throughout Britain.69 Such union had already occurred in 1784, when opposition to Pitt's new excise on fustians (bleached or dyed stuffs of cotton or mixed cotton and linen) helped spawn the first national and exclusively manufacturing lobbying organization, the General Chamber of Manufacturers, and encouraged a more radical critique of the entire excise system.70 Pitt repealed the much-hated fustian tax in the spring of 1785 but learned from the experience to abhor the prospect of future dealings with a united manufacturing interest. Much as he was trying to free himself and the state from the hold of older, broad-based interests, in particular the monied interest, he now sought to forestall the creation of a new united manufacturing interest, or at least to curb its admission as a full player in the game.71 Clearly this involved defusing potentially inflammatory issues, such as a particular excise tax which one industrial group might try to transform into a manufacturing cause celebre. The Lowland distillers stood poised to effect such a transformation and to champion such a cause. Under the Wash Act, they complained, gaugers of "indifferent character" were sent to survey them, watchmen were stationed in their distilleries around the clock, and exchequer prosecutions were threatened as a matter of course, the combined effects of which were forcing them out of business.72 In agitating for an extension of the license system, they sought to simplify their daily operations and remove excisemen as much as possible from their premises. As one sympathetic pamphleteer proclaimed, "the Scottish manufacture was to be put upon the general footing of a license-duty, and that duty being paid, the distillery was to have no more concern with the Excise, but every man left to his own industry and his own method, which is the true way to improvement in manufactures."73 Of course whisky distillers, unlike cotton manufacturers, could not go so far as to declare their products unfit subjects for taxation-such a moral claim on behalf of spirits, they recognized, was not likely to receive favorable attention-but they could join in the manufacturing chorus against the way in which particular excise duties were assessed and collected.
The message, moreover, had considerable resonance beyond the manufacturing community. Parliamentary and executive inquiries followed, after which Pitt concluded that "it had been fully proved that the Scotch distillers had ever since the passing of the act in the session of 1786, enjoyed a very considerable superiority over the English distillers." The Lowland License Act, he maintained, represented a concession to the Scottish industry, encouraging it to produce for local consumption and to challenge the smuggling trade. In granting Scotland its own assessment procedures, however, neither the government nor the legislature had intended to give her spirits an advantage in the English market. Pitt therefore proposed an additional equalizing duty for those Scottish spirits exported to England as a stopgap measure, and "a more full revision of the subject" in the months to come.88 That revision, which went into effect on July 5, 1788, required all Scottish distillers producing for the English market to take out licenses (now doubled to ?3 per gallon capacity) as before and to notify the Excise twelve months in advance of any plans to export. Then, prior to landing their cargoes at English ports, they were to pay excise officers there the equivalent of an English wash survey assessment. In compensation for such double indemnity, the Lowland distillers were to receive a pro-rated abatement on their license duties for the time they 
